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JUSTICE LOUIS H. BURKE-A TRIBUTE
by Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner*
Justice Louis Burke is a judge who fits into no pre-ordained category.
A handsome six-foot-three man whose open features suggest an almost
boyish quality, Justice Burke may conjure up visions of an approach to
the law that is simple and easily defined, but the record does not confirm
any such assumption. Justice Burke's background may give a clue. I
am told his mother was a charming, tiny, courageous French woman of
high'native intelligence; his father, a somewhat gregarious person of
Irish background, a practical, conservative man, who rose to some
prominence in local Canadian politics. It is not surprising that Justice
Burke does not easily fit into the "liberal" or "conservative' stereotype
or the Republican or Democratic model.
The record of his ten year span on the Supreme Court (1964-1974)
consists of the remarkable productivity of 237 majority opinions, 105
dissents, 37 concurring and dissents, 7 concurring, and 5 by the court,
totalling 391. When it is remembered that at least one-half of Justice
Burke's time must have been occupied in preparing for weekly conferences for the disposition of an approximate average of 80 petitions for
hearings, writs and State Bar matters, as well as passing upon the
opinions of his colleagues, the record is even more impressive. Nor does
this evaluation take into account the tremendous effort and time Justice
Burke devoted to the American Bar Association, the National Center for
State Courts and the American Judicature Society. I have written elsewhere' of Justice Burke as an administrator of such programs, as a nonjudicial man, as the devoted husband of his remarkable wife, Ruth, and
as the father of five successful children. Let us look briefly at his
illustrious record as a writer of Supreme Court opinions.
Justice Burke's record in the field of criminal law illustrates his
independence of a categorical or rigid approach to problems in that
area, as well as his open-mindedness and willingness to reexamine
previously held positions. The death penalty cases furnish telling exam3
z
ples. His positions in People v. Goedecke and People v. Nicolaus
* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court.
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perhaps foreshadowed his ultimate rejection of the harsh sanction of the
death penalty. In each of these cases, Justice Burke wrote opinions
reducing a first degree murder conviction carrying the death penalty to
second degree murder.
The facts of each case, tragically revolting as they were, demonstrated
the utter inappropriateness of the death penalty. In Goedecke, the court
was confronted with a first degree murder conviction of an 18-year old
boy who had killed his father, mother, brother and sister after attending
a religious meeting. He could not state what was in his mind during the
episode except, after its commission, the thought that he should get out
of his parents' house. Justice Burke's opinion points out that there was
no psychiatric testimony as to the extent to which the defendant could
maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated
act and therefore Justice Schauer's test in People v. Wolf4 had not been
met.
Similarly, in Nicolaus, a father who had been hospitalized in a psychiatric unit and who had considered himself a follower of Hitler and
possessed of god-like qualities, killed his three children. Justice Burke
wrote the opinion for the court, holding that such a defendant lacked the
capacity to understand the enormity of his conduct and could not be
held guilty of first degree murder. Thus, Justice Burke courageously
followed the doctrine of diminished capacity to avoid inflicting the death
penalty on defendants unable to comprehend the quantum of the enormity of their conduct.
The death penalty cases offer another instance of Justice Burke's
humanity and insistence that, in the criminal field, the court look to the
substance of the cases rather than to inapposite and outmoded rules. In
the first instance of our court's in-depth adjudication of the constitutionality of the death penalty, In re Anderson," Justice Burke upheld the
penalty against the charge that it was a denial of equal protection and
due process because the issue of life or death was determined without
4. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
[T]he true test must include consideration of the somewhat limited extent to which
this defendant could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act.
[Tihe use by the Legislature of "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated" in conjunction indicates its intent to require as an essential element of first degree murder
(of that category) substantially more reflection; i.e., more understanding and comprehension of the character of the act than the mere amount of thought necessary
to form the intention to kill.
Id. at 821-22, 394 P.2d at 975-76, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
5. 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1968).
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any test, standard or guide-post and hence at the purely subjective and
arbitrary choice of the fact-finder. I wrote the dissent in that case, and
although I was joined by Justices Traynor and Peters, Justice Burke
spoke for the majority.
Justice Burke, however, continued to give the matter grave and
serious thought; he often discussed the issue with me, explaining that he
believed the death penalty might serve a function as a deterrent to the
would-be murderer. The issue became a matter of friendly but sincere
debate in which Justice Burke and I engaged over the years. Yet I shall
never forget the day when at lunch he told me that I should be happy
indeed because he had finally reached the conclusion that the death
penalty could probably not be constitutionally sustained. And thus in
People v. Anderson,' Justice Burke joined the majority in holding that
the death penalty violated the California Constitution as an infliction of
cruel or unusual punishment. His vote marked him as an open-minded,
sensitive jurist, and as an independent thinker willing to re-evaluate a
long-accepted rule in light of changing times.
But Justice Burke also held a strong belief that sometimes our court
erred on the side of the criminal defendant in over-emphasizing an error
that might have occurred in the course of a trial and overlooking the
mandate of Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which
provides that the error does not require reversal unless it is prejudicial.
He particularly believed that the failure to inform a defendant of his
right to counsel under the doctrine of People v. Dorado7 and Mirandav.
Arizona8 should be tested in the crucible of the prejudicial error rule
rather than compel automatic reversal, as our court has, indeed, held.9
In this respect Justice Burke finds present support in the thoughtful and
erudite book of Justice Flemming, The Price of Perfect Justice. ° I
presume that this issue will continue to intrigue judges and to evoke
conflicting responses for many years to come.
In the field of constitutional law Justice Burke contributed many
decisions of outstanding significance. There are too many to analyze in
detail but I shall emphasize some that unquestionably influenced the
progression of the law in this vital area.
When Justice Burke served as the presiding justice for the Court of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967).
M. FLEMMiNG, THE PRIcE OF PERFECr JUSTICE (1974).
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Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, he recorded his deep
aversion to racial discrimination in the important case of Abstract
Investment Co. v. Hutchinson." There he held that in an unlawful
detainer action a defendant tenant must be permitted to show, as a
special defense, that his eviction had been sought wholly on the ground
that he was a Black. Such discrimination, wrote Justice Burke, would
bar court-ordered eviction since the resulting state action would violate
the California and Federal constitutions. This holding was one of the
first expressions against racial discrimination that one can find in the
California law books; it anticipated, and to some extent, inspired our
1966 ruling in Mulkey v. Reitman,12 which, in invalidating Proposition
14, relied in part on the Abstract case. 3 Justice Burke had the satisfaction of joining with the majority in Mulkey.
Justice Burke's decisions have recognized that the criminal defendant
should not be treated as a penal statistic but as a human being entitled to
the possibility of rehabilitation and the protection of the Constitution. In
In re Foss, 4 he struck down as cruel and unusual punishment for
repeated offenders a provision of the California drug laws which mandated a minimum 10-year sentence without possibility of parole. Justice
Burke pointed out that "even though the offender may have suffered a
second conviction because of his addiction, once he has been able to
overcome that addiction or show a real promise of rehabilitation and of
being able to remain free of further narcotic usage he may not be tried
under parole supervision but must still remain in prison until the expiration of the mandatory 10-year period." He concluded that "by hindering
the Adult Authority's ability to tailor the punishment to fit the rehabilitative progress of the particular offender, the provision precluding parole consideration increases the cost to the society of the offender's
incarceration both in terms of the dollar cost of a longer imprisonment
and in terms of the ill effects suffered by offenders from unduly long
periods of imprisonment."' 5
In similar recognition that the defendant as a human being should not
be shunted off to a state hospital without the opportunity to stand trial
within a reasonable time to show recovery from illness, Justice Burke
11. 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962).
12. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), aff'd 387 U.S. 369
(1967).
13. Id. at 538, 413 P.2d at 831, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
14. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1093, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
15. Id. at 924, 925, 519 P.2d at 1081, 1082, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 658, 659.
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wrote the opinion in In re Davis.' 6 There he held that a person charged
with criminal offenses and committed to a state hospital solely because
of his incapacity to stand trial may not be confined more than the
reasonable time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
likelihood of his recovery in the foreseeable future.
Justice Burke, indeed, recorded his sensitivity to the rights of the
individual as against the powerful institution of government, whether
the individual was the subject of government snooping, or an individual
indigent, or an individual prosecuted in the justice court. Thus, in
People v. Edwards,1 7 he upheld, as an alternative to the rigid "open
fields" test in search and seizure cases, the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard, in order to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into one's personal privacy. In Ferguson v. Keays,'8 he held
that an indigent civil litigant should have the right to be relieved of
statutory filing fees in the event that he could not afford to pay them.
Moreover, in Gordon v. Justice Court,'0 he held that criminal trials
which could result in the defendant's imprisonment, conducted by nonlawyer judges, did not meet the standards of due process of law. He
held that so-called "police judges" must at leastbe qualified lawyers.
Justice Burke has given us outstanding decisions in the field of workers' compensation cases. They are characterized by his adherence to the
statutory mandate of liberal construction and resolution of all doubts in
favor of compensability.
Thus, probing into the "going and coming" rule which has already
undergone considerable erosion, Justice Burke carved out further limitations. In Le Febvre v. WCAB, 2 9 the record showed that the employer
required a volunteer fireman to travel to evening fire drills. Justice
Burke held that workers' compensation to the wife of the fireman who
died in a car accident while en route to the drill was not barred by the
"going and coming" rule; the fireman was compelled to undertake this
additional risk and exposure to accident as an incident to employment.
Likewise, in Dimmig v. WCAB, 2 ' an employer encouraged an employee
to attend night college classes; the employer paid part of the tuition
because the instruction afforded to the- worker benefitted the employer.
16. 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870
(1973).
17. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
18. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
19. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72,,115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974).
20. 69 Cal. 2d 386, 445 P.2d 319, 71 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1968).
21. 6 Cal. 3d 860, 495 P.2d 433, 101 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1972).
-
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Justice Burke held that the employee, who was injured while returning
home from such a night college class, could not be barred from recovery
by the "going and coming" rule.
Justice Burke's recognition of the statutory mandate of liberal construction and the importance of the referee's role in determining credibility of witnesses finds illustration in a number of cases. Evans v.
WCAB 22 and Kerley v. WCAB28 attest his enforcement of the liberal
construction rule; Garza v. WCAB 2 4 shows his implementation of the
referee's function. The latter is a most important case, for there Justice
Burke held that in view of the referee's competence to decide matters of
credibility and other questions of fact, his findings are entitled to great
weight. The findings are not subject to rejection by the board in the
absence of contrary findings strongly supported by substantial evidence.
Nor should the findings be upset by mere speculation and surmise.
Justice Burke concluded: "[lihe denial of compensation benefits cannot rest upon the board's mere suspicion or surmise, in view of the
policy of the law to resolve all reasonable doubts in the employee's
favor.

25

The list of Justice Burke's contributions could go on endlessly; I have
omitted whole subject matters of the law in which he has written
important decisions. I cannot, of course, discuss some 391 opinions.
Suffice it to say, the ones that I have noted show that, despite the
occasional assertion that Justice Burke is a "conservative," the designation simply does not fit. In any event, classifications of that nature do
not accurately describe appellate judges; I would submit, for whatever it
is worth, that Justice Burke could as appropriately wear the mantle of
"liberal." I cite to you the comment of the writers in the March, 1974
issue of the California Law Review, analyzing the work of our court,
who conclude that Justice Burke's "so-called conservative outlook includes a passion for fairness and due process."2 6 The record at the least
bears out this appraisal, and, indeed, establishes more.
When we regard Justice Burke as a man, we see a rugged simplicity
that marks him as one who works beautifully in wood, paints sensitive
pictures, builds fences at his farmlike home, and wields an expert
hammer as a carpenter. When we look at him as a judge we find a
22. 68 Cal. 2d 753, 441 P.2d 633, 68 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1968).
23. 4 Cal. 3d 223, 481 P.2d 200, 93 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1971).
24. 3 Cal. 3d 312, 475 P.2d 451, 90 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1970).
25. Id. at 319, 475 P.2d at 456, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
26. Forward: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALiU. L. REV. 303, 363 (1974).
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record that is by no means simple. There are interesting angles, intellectual nuances, unexpected originality and warm acceptance of human
need.
And so when Lou Burke announced that he would retire from the
Supreme Court, I suspected that I would miss him-miss his warmth,
his stories of the building of his home at Necassio, Matin County; and of
the vicissitudes of tending ducks, geese, cats and a dog, fending off
racoons, and similarly marvelous tales on a myriad of other subjects.
(He is a superb raconteur.) I would miss his counsel, his appraisal of
the cases, his contributions to our court. I must say in all honesty that
those fears of loss have borne out; I miss him deeply.

